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We ask and answer questions every day. But beneath these seemingly straightforward 
interchanges lie a series of cognitive and communicative processes, which when better 
understood, allow for better understanding of how cultures and questions influence answers (for 
reviews see Schwarz, 1999; Sirken et al., 1999; Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996; Tourangeau, 
Rips, & Rasinski, 2000).  In answering questions, people take into account what the question 
likely meant, bring to mind relevant information, and then edit this information to form a 
response (Strack & Martin, 1987; Tourangeau, 1984). Each of these steps may be influenced 
both by features of the questionnaire and research context as well as by the culture within which 
the research is taking place.  
What the question likely means, its pragmatic meaning, influences both what comes to 
mind and the response-editing process.  Advances in two fields, cultural (and cross-cultural) 
psychology and cognitive survey methodology, provide important insights into these processes. 
Unfortunately these fields have not converged so their insights have not been integrated. This 
integration is addressed in the current chapter and its companion chapter, by Schwarz, 
Oyserman, and Peytcheva (this volume). Much of the current cultural and cross-cultural 
literature focuses on the contrast between Western individualism and East Asian collectivism and 
the Schwarz and colleagues’ chapter provides an insightful overview of this literature. 
In the current chapter, we move beyond East Asian, Confucian-based collectivism, to 
address another form of collectivism, honor-based collectivism, a kind of collectivism prevalent 
in other parts of the world-- including the Middle East, Mediterranean and Latin American 
countries. Because relatively less empirical work has focused on honor-based collectivism, we 
emphasize this literature in the next section of this chapter, providing an overview comparing 
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collective cultures of honor with collective cultures of modesty and individualistic cultures that 
could be termed cultures of self-enhancement. Much of this literature is ethnographic and even 
when quantitative research exists, it does not have in mind the needs of survey researchers. 
However, this literature does highlight issues that survey methodologists should start attending 
to. To begin to create a bridge between this literature and the concerns of survey methodologists, 
in the second section of this chapter we briefly summarize the communicative and cognitive 
processes involved, making predictions about how culture of honor should influence pragmatic 
meaning, judgment and recall, and response editing. Because direct evidence is limited, we 
highlight work of our own in this area. 
 
2 HONOR, MODESTY, AND SELF-ENHANCEMENT: DISTINGUISHING 
CULTURE’S BASIC DIFFERENCES 
  
Though societies differ in many ways, researchers have been interested in identifying a 
few key dimensions of culture that are associated with systematic differences from which general 
predictions can be made (see Oyserman, Kemmelmeier & Coon, 2002 for an integrative process 
model). To date the individualism-collectivism dimension has captured most popular appeal and 
concerns whether cultures emphasize individuals or groups across a variety of domains (e.g., 
Hofstede, 1980). Simply defined, individualism is the extent to which individuals are perceived 
as a basic unit of analysis while collectivism is the extent to which groups (and individual 
membership within groups) are perceived as a basic unit of analysis (see Oyserman & Sorensen, 
in press, for a review). Individualism highlights separateness, each person is a unique and 
worthwhile individual. Collectivism highlights connectivity between and among persons; 
persons gain meaning and worth through connection.  
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While early research on collectivism was informed by its Mediterranean-based forms (see 
Triandis, 1989), the form of collectivism most often studied is Confucian-based. In this form of 
collectivism, focus is on harmony – modesty, fitting in, not sticking out, and not bragging 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In their chapter, Schwarz, Oyserman and Peytcheva (this volume) 
summarize the literature comparing Western Europeans and North Americans with East Asians 
and the implications of these differences for survey response. This comparison is valuable and 
forms the bulk of the empirical cross-cultural literature.  
However, understanding Confucian-based collectivism is not sufficient for survey 
researchers conducting studies elsewhere, including areas of emerging interest such as the 
Mediterranean region (including Spain, Greece, and Turkey), Latin America, the Middle East, 
and Africa. In these regions, an alternative form of collectivism, focused on honor, has been 
reported as we describe below. Within a culture of honor, the central collective dimension is 
maintaining a good reputation – both within the group and with regard to relationships with out-
groups.  Like Confucian-based cultures of modesty, cultures of honor are collective – groups and 
group membership matter and reputation is both gained and lost not only through one’s own 
actions, but also through the actions of others with whom one is closely associated (typically kin 
but also other social groupings). Because cultures of honor are collective in focus, it is likely that 
at least some of the literature on cognitive consequences of collectivism is generalizable beyond 
East Asia. By examining differences between collective cultures of honor and collective cultures 
of modesty it will be possible to specify more specific predictions about how cultural dimensions 
or syndromes are likely to matter for survey researchers. In the following section, we focus on 
cultural differences in norms for self-presentation since these are likely to be influenced by 
whether cultures focus on maintaining harmony or maintaining a good reputation and to 
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influence how questions are understood, what comes to mind, and how information is edited and 
communicated within a survey. 
 
2.1  Individualism 
Individualism prescribes a world view in which individuals are encouraged to define 
themselves and others as unique and separate individuals with different goals, preferences, and 
attitudes (for reviews see Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). Individualism makes 
salient norms of self-confidence and self-enhancement (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 
1999; Heine, 2007; Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Suzuki & 
Yamagishi, 2004; Yamaguchi, 1994). Individuals are assumed to be responsible for themselves 
and a key self-presentational goal is to positively present oneself (for a review see Heine, 2007; 
Oyserman et al., 2002).  
Indeed, the mostly American literature on self-valuation demonstrates that Americans 
tend to have positive self-views (e.g., Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989) and to prefer 
information that maintains or enhances these positive self-views (e.g., Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 
1989). This preference for positivity extends to family members. Westerners evaluate close 
family members more positively (Endo et al., 2000) and are less critical in evaluating their 
children’s performance (Stevenson & Stigler, 1992) than East Asians. However, there is no 
reason to assume that this preference for positivity is not even more general. Because 
individuals, not groups, are salient, and relationships between individuals are based on joint 
interest, people in individualistic cultural settings are less likely to process information in terms 
of in- or out-group memberships; today’s stranger could be tomorrow’s friend (Oyserman, 1993; 
Oyserman et al., 2002). This implies that there are no strong prescriptions for the evaluation of 
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strangers (e.g., Bond & Smith, 1996; Iyengar, Lepper, & Ross, 1999, Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 
1994).  
 
2.2  Collectivism 
 Collectivism focuses attention on the importance of the social interface – groups, how 
one fits into them, one’s position within the group, and the ways to maintain positive status as a 
group member. Recent reviews of the literature demonstrate a reliance on East Asian samples to 
study collectivism, although some data have also been collected with other samples, including 
Latino or Hispanic American and Mexican participants (see Oyserman, Coon, et al., 2002, for a 
review). Theoretical perspectives on cultural differences in psychological processes are rooted in 
research using Chinese and Japanese samples (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, 2003) 
and there is little evidence that these can be generalized to other cultural contexts (perhaps with 
the exception of cognitive differences involving salience of contextual information, see 
Oyserman & Lee, 2008, for a review). In the section below, we focus on differences in self-
presentational norms between collectivism emerging from East Asian and from other contexts.  
 
East-Asian Collectivism. Confucian-based collectivism makes salient connections, nestedness of 
individuals within relationships, self-effacement, and modesty as ways of fitting in (Heine et al., 
1999; Heine, 2007; Kitayama et al., 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Suzuki & Yamagishi, 
2004; Yamaguchi, 1994). Within Confucian-based collective societies, key self-presentational 
goals are to be modest, not to stick out (Heine, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 
1989), and not offend others (Suzuki & Yamagishi, 2004). The difference in self-presentational 
goals between Western and East Asian contexts is important for survey researchers who might 
otherwise interpret modest responses among East Asian respondents as reflecting less positive 
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self-evaluation. A series of studies using more implicit measures of positive self-evaluation 
underscore the importance of taking into account norms of self-presentation. In these studies,  
Japanese respondents were more modest than Americans in their explicit responses, but no 
differences were found when more implicit measures such as the Implicit Association Test 
(Kitayama & Uchida, 2003) or tests assessing preference for letters in one’s own name and 
numbers corresponding to one’s birthday (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997) are used, suggesting 
that differences are in self-presentation rather than true differences in self-valuation. Just as self-
ratings are likely to be influenced by modesty and norms concerning not offending others, these 
norms are also likely to influence positivity of rating in-group and close others given the large 
overlap between the self and ingroup in Confucian-based collective societies. For example, when 
East Asian parents and teachers were asked to rate the performance of their children, their ratings 
were more negative than were those of American parents and teachers, in spite of the fact that the 
objective performance of East Asian children was better than that of American children 
(Stevenson & Stigler, 1992). These results suggest that survey responses about oneself as well as 
proxy responses about others to whom one is connected are likely to be filtered through a norm 
of modesty. The norm should be relevant whenever the question cues a connection to self or 
group membership – there would be no need for modesty in appraising others who are irrelevant 
to self or group membership.  
 
African, Latin American, Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern Collectivism. While East Asian 
Confucian-based collectivism highlights the need for modesty in self-presentation, in other 
regions of the world, another form of collectivism has been studied: honor-based collectivism. 
Honor is a form of collectivism based on social image and social reputation (Abu-Lughod, 1999; 
Cohen et al., 1996; Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1965; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 
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2000; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, in press; Stewart, 1994). Honor-
based collectivism does not highlight modesty but rather emphasizes the public nature of self-
worth and the need to protect and maintain honor through positive presentation of oneself and in-
group members. Honor is a social psychological construct in that having, maintaining, losing, 
and restoring honor involves others; honor requires that others respect the self and view the self 
as having positive moral standing, and only when this occurs can one feel self-pride (Nisbett & 
Cohen, 1996; Pitt-Rivers, 1965; Stewart, 1994).  
Honor was originally studied by anthropologists in regions such as Spain, Greece, 
Cyprus, Egypt, and Algeria using ethnographic methods such as participant observation (e.g., see 
Peristiany, 1965).  Across locations, these studies highlight honor as maintenance of good 
reputation – maintained through good family reputation, social interdependence, and 
maintenance of gender-specific codes of behavior (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1999; Gilmore, 1987; Pitt-
Rivers, 1965, 1977). Honor has also been studied extensively in Turkey, also primarily using 
qualitative methods (e.g., Kardam, 2005; Bagli & Sev’er, 2003). According to existing studies, 
honor is central to Turkish culture. A rich vocabulary to define and discuss honor is likely to be a 
reflection of the centrality of the concept in this culture (Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001). In Turkish 
culture, one’s honorable deeds are a valued possession, they reinforces close ties binding the 
individual, family, kin, and community (Ozgur & Sunar, 1982). Studies on the conception of 
honor in Turkey point to its strong relational form and reveal that honor belongs to individuals as 
well as family members (Kardam, 2005; Bagli & Sev’er, 2003) and that individuals strongly feel 
to defend their honor when attacked. Indeed, Turkey is one of several countries in which honor 
crimes persist (Kardam, 2005; Pervizat, 1998; Yirmibesoglu, 1997). 
Moving beyond qualitative research on honor, social psychologists Cohen and Nisbett 
and their colleagues (Cohen, 1996, 1998; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, 1997; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, 
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& Schwarz, 1996; Cohen, Vandello, & Rantilla, 1998; Nisbett, 1993) and Rodriguez Mosquera 
and her colleagues (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000, 2002; Fischer et al., 1999) focused on 
the concept of honor using more quantitative methods. While Cohen and Nisbett focused on the 
United States, Rodriguez Mosquera and her colleagues focused on Spain. Taken together, this 
quantitative body of work on honor-based collectivism is important because it highlights 
manifestations of honor-based cultural norms in a variety of modern societies. 
In particular, Cohen and Nisbett argue that honor norms are likely to develop anywhere 
where law enforcement is weak or absent, wealth is portable and economic outcomes are both 
variable and uncertain (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). They focused on the 
United States, examining existence of a culture of honor in the southern and western U.S. 
(Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Honor in this social context is characterized by the willingness to use 
force or violence to protect one’s social status and position. If that is the case, then laws and 
policies should allow for such forms of violence, adults should support it, and behavioral traces 
of honor responses should be observable in laboratory situations. Across a series of studies, the 
impact of honor was found across each of these domains. Action to protect honor is safe-guarded 
in the laws and social policies of the American South and West more so than in the American 
North and East (Cohen, 1996, 1998; Cohen & Nisbett, 1997). Survey data collected in telephone 
interviews with adults demonstrated that American Southerners and Westerners voiced greater 
support for honor-related violence (and not violence in general) than did American Northerners 
(Cohen & Nisbett, 1994).   
This correlation between geographic location and honor-based values was further tested 
in a series of experiments with students from Southern and Northern states who were all 
attending the same mid-Western university. In these experiments, male students were randomly 
assigned to an insult or non-insult condition. Cohen and colleagues (Cohen et al., 1996; Cohen et 
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al., 1998) demonstrated that Southerners perceived insults in terms of threats to honor – they 
were both more likely to see insults as damaging their masculine reputation and more likely to 
engage in domineering and aggressive behavioral responses than Northerners. These results are 
likely to generalize to Latino or Hispanic cultures, as more recently studied by Cohen and 
colleagues (e.g., Vandello & Cohen, 2003). 
In a series of studies, Rodriguez Mosquera and colleagues have demonstrated that within 
Europe, the expected differences can also be shown. Thus, social conceptualizations of honor are 
more salient in Spain than in the Netherlands (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000, 2002; 
Fischer et al., 1999). Spanish participants rate honor and honor-related values such as social 
recognition as more important than do Dutch participants (Fischer et al., 1999). When asked to 
describe honor, Spanish participants describe honor in relation to family and social 
interdependence; for Dutch participants, honor is not socially contingent (Rodriguez Mosquera, 
et al., 2002). Spanish participants respond more intensely to standardized insult vignettes than 
Dutch participants when insults threatened family honor, and this between-country difference is 
mediated by individual differences in concern for family honor (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 
2002).  
As shown by Rodriguez Mosquera and colleagues, honor in such societies includes both 
the individual and closely related others. In honor-based collectivistic societies honor is shared 
with close others and those in the individuals’ important social groups (Mojab & Abdu, 2004; 
Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002). Honor is a form of collectivism in that one’s own honor is 
implicated by the honor of close others; social respect can be lost through one’s own failures as 
well as through the failures of close others or can be gained or enhanced through one’s own 
successes as well as the successes of close others (Gregg, 2005, 2007; Stewart, 1994). Thus the 
 11 
extent to which one’s personal worth is determined interpersonally is a distinct feature of honor 
cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000).  
In honor-based collective societies, reputation matters, and reputation is a social construct 
that includes the esteem to which one’s group is held, not simply personal attainments. Thus, in 
honor-based societies, positive evaluation of one’s in-group is quite critical (Abu-Lughod, 1999; 
Rodriguez Mosquera et al., in press).  Just as in other forms of collectivism, self- and social 
identities are highly connected (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1994). This means 
that protection of social image is a core psychological concern in honor cultures. Social 
situations in which the personal or social self may be negatively evaluated are threatening and 
this threat needs to be responded to; not responding properly can lead to dishonor (see e.g., 
Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1967). Whereas among Confucian-based collectivism, the way to 
maintain positive relations is through a norm of modesty, for honor-based collectivism, the way 
to maintain positive relations is through a norm of positive representation of the self and in-
group and negative representation of out-groups.  
 
3. CULTURE AND SURVEY RESPONSE 
Next, we address how these cultural orientations affect the survey response process.  
Whereas the survey response process can be divided into three broad sections: question 
comprehension, recall, and response editing (Strack & Martin, 1987; Tourangeau, 1984), in the 
current chapter we focus in particular on the first and last parts of this process.  
 
3.1 Making Sense of Questions: Pragmatic Inference Processes 
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 As a first step, respondents need to understand the question to determine what information 
they are to provide. Here, respondents need to figure out what the researcher likely intends to find 
out (Clark & Schober, 1992).  This can be called the pragmatic meaning of the question and it 
comes not simply from the words that are used but also from the context in which the question is 
presented (for a review see Schwarz, 1999). On the one hand, everyone uses context at least to some 
extent, on the other hand, given that collectivism highlights the importance of social context, it 
seems reasonable to predict that members of collective cultures might be chronically more sensitive 
to features of the social context. We detail the implications of this, focusing on one aspect of 
context, scale format. 
In a sense, filling out a questionnaire can be thought of as a form of conversation, albeit a 
conversation in which only the researcher is asking questions and only the respondent is 
replying. Just as in any conversation, respondents rely on a number of tacit assumptions to make 
sense of their task and provide sensible answers given their understanding of the pragmatic 
meaning of questions in context (see Schwarz, 1994, 1999).  Research conversations are one-
sided in the sense that the researcher cannot be directly queried by the respondent, either because 
responses are elicited via a self-administered mechanism such as a questionnaire or because 
interviewers have been trained not to provide interpretations so as to standardize response. 
Therefore, respondents must draw pragmatic meaning from larger cultural context and the 
proximal contextual cues present in the research context. These contextual cues include what 
may at first glance appear to be “formal” features of questions, such as the numeric values used 
to represent points on the scale (Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz, Oyserman, & Peytcheva, this volume).  
Suppose participants are asked in a survey to report on their success in life using a rating 
scale anchored with "not at all successful" and "extremely successful".  To provide a rating, they 
have to determine the intended meaning of the end labels. For example, does "not at all successful" 
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refer to the absence of outstanding achievements or to the presence of serious failures?  Given that 
survey contexts offer little opportunity to clarify the meaning of questions, to infer the intended 
meaning, participants may draw on the numeric values provided in the rating scale. Using German 
participants and survey-based experimental methods, Schwarz and his colleagues (1991) tested 
this possibility. They found that respondents did give systematically different assessments of 
how successful they have been in life when the numeric format of the rating scale is varied. On 
average scores were lower and about a third of individual respondents used the lower half of the 
range in responding when the scale was from 0 to 10. In contrast, when the scale was from -5 to 
+5, many fewer respondents used the lower half of the range and when the scores were recoded 
to range from 0 to 10, the average score was higher. Why would this be? 
When the rating scale ran from 0 to 10, respondents seemed to understand the question as 
being one about the extent of success, as a unipolar construct -- one could have more or less 
success. When the rating scale ran from -5 to +5, respondents seemed to understand the question 
as being one about the extent of success or failure, a bipolar construct -- one could have more or 
less success (positive numbers) as well as more or less failure (negative numbers).  Thus the 
numeric values used to make up the rating scales seemed to have affected participants’ 
interpretation of the intended meaning conveyed by the anchor labels. To further test this 
interpretation, Schwarz and colleagues (1991) asked another set of German respondents to draw 
inferences about a target person based on the target persons’ description of academic success. In 
all cases, the target person’s rating was in the third position on an 11-point scale. What differed 
was whether the scale was a 0 to 10 scale or a -5 to +5 scale. A random half of participants read 
about a target person who rated his prior success as a ‘2’ on a 0 to 10 scale. The other random 
half of participants read about a target person who rated his prior success as a ‘-3’ on a -5 to +5 
scale. Though all respondents viewed formally equivalent information (the third lowest response 
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on an 11-point scale with the exact same verbal anchors of "not at all successful" and "extremely 
successful"), would the pragmatic meaning be the same? Not if the -5 to +5 scale implied that 
success is a bi-polar construct and the 0 to 10 scale implied that success is a unipolar construct. If 
pragmatic inference differed then respondents should understand a ‘-3’ response on the -5 to +5 
scale as reporting some failures and a ‘2’ response on the 0 to 10 scale as reporting not much 
success. Indeed, in the former case, respondents predicted that the target had experienced more 
academic failure, specifically that he needed to repeat more exams because he had failed them, 
than in the latter case.  
Taken together, these studies, as well as a larger body of research on context effects on 
pragmatic inference suggest that research participants take into account even seemingly formal 
features of questionnaires in making inferences about what the questioner likely means. Once 
inferences are drawn, however, respondents still have to decide how they will respond. While the 
research on cultural differences simply suggests that higher collectivism should increase 
sensitivity to context effects (see Schwarz et al., this volume, for a review), as we have outlined 
in our section on culture’s effects on self-presentational norms, there are likely to be effects of 
culture on this last phase of questionnaire response as well. 
 
3.2. Recall, Response Formatting and Editing 
Once respondents have figured out what a question is likely about, but before providing a 
response, they need to recall relevant information and figure out how to fit their own response into 
the format of the question and to edit their response to fit norms of propriety. This is a universal 
process, just as the search for pragmatic meaning is universal. All things being equal, members of 
all cultures attempt to present themselves in a favorable light. However, as we have outlined in the 
section on cultural norms for self-presentation, acceptable strategies for doing so, and the specific 
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content that is considered favorable, differ between cultures.   
Specifically, while individualist cultures encourage a positive view of the self and others, 
they also further value honesty in interaction with strangers (Triandis, 1995).  In contrast, 
Confucian-based collectivist cultures emphasize the maintenance of harmonious relationships with 
others and are more concerned with fitting in and saving face while honor-based collectivist 
cultures emphasize positive presentation of self- and in-group. For both forms of collectivism, 
some “editing” of the truth is considered acceptable in the interest of appropriate norm fulfillment 
(Ho, 1976; Triandis, 1995). Because norms differ, this would imply a specific pattern of culture by 
target interaction. Whereas individualistic positivity norms would result in positive ratings 
regardless of the target and modesty norms of Confucian collectivism would result in dampened 
ratings of self and in-group, but not influence the evaluation of out-groups, honor-based 
collectivism positivity norms would result in heightened ratings for self and in-group and lower 
ratings for out-group members. Thus respondents from individualistic, modesty-based and honor-
based collective societies would edit their responses differently depending on whether the target 
of judgment was the self, a close other, or not an in-group member. Both individualistic and 
honor-based societies should promote self-enhancement (of self and in-group members, 
particularly close others) compared with modesty-based societies. Members of modesty-based 
societies would notice the different implications of unipolar and bipolar scales, but given the 
cultural imperative to be modest, respondents from modesty-based societies should be less likely 
to attempt to correct for the negative implications of the bipolar scale when rating themselves or 
close in-group others. Instead, the bipolar scale may even highlight concerns about modesty, 
resulting in lower self and close-family ratings. Conversely, members of individualism and 
honor-based societies should be loath to use the lower end of the bipolar scale when rating 
themselves or close family members. With regard to strangers, members of modesty-based 
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societies would have no reason to rate them in a way that may imply failures in their lives; to the 
contrary, one’s own modesty may be expressed in positive ratings of strangers. However, self-
enhancing individualistic societies offer no strong prescriptions for the evaluation of strangers, 
whereas derogation of out-groups is more acceptable in collective, honor-based societies. 
In a direct test of these hypotheses, Uskul, Oyserman, Schwarz, Lee, and Xu (2008) 
replicated and extended Schwarz et al.’s (1991) design in a pilot and two experimental studies. 
Whereas the goal of Schwarz and colleagues’ (1991) initial work was to demonstrate the impact 
of pragmatic meaning the goal of the Uskul and colleagues’ (2008) studies was to demonstrate 
the interaction between pragmatic meaning and cultural norms. Whereas the Schwarz et al. 
(1991) studies included only German participants and did not explicitly take a cultural 
perspective, Uskul and colleagues (2008) compared participants from societies marked by 
individualism (Americans), honor-based collectivism (Turks), and Confucian-based collectivism 
(Chinese).  Because a culture-based framework would lead to different predictions depending on 
whether a respondent is asked to report on self, in-group or non-group relevant others, they also 
moved beyond Schwarz and colleagues (1991) initial focus on self and own parents to also 
examine ratings of strangers of the same age as parents.  To clarify that the dependent variable, 
success in life, was equally desirable across the three cultural groups, they asked college students 
in each country, how desirable being “successful in life” was to them, finding that life success 
was equally desirable – slightly higher than a five on a seven point scale -  in each of the three 
cultures.   
Results highlight the importance of using a culturally informed model. Culture-relevant 
effects were found for scales and pattern of responses in ways that suggest that effects are not 
due simply to differences in what unipolar and bipolar scales imply about the relative presence of 
positive attributes but also to differences in culturally-appropriate use of the affordances 
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provided by the scales to represent the self and close others.  In both honor-based collectivistic 
and individualistic cultures, appropriate responses are positively enhancing of self and close 
others. In modesty-based collective cultures, modest descriptions of self and close others are 
appropriate responses. Results followed this pattern.  
Specifically, Chinese respondents gave more modest ratings of their own success and that 
of their parents than either Turkish or American respondents, who were equally positive in their 
ratings of parents and self. With regard to the interaction of scale and question target, while 
Chinese respondents were modest in their assessment of self and parents independent of whether 
the scale was unipolar or bipolar, the assessments of Turks and Americans were higher when the 
scale was bipolar, just as were German participants in the original Schwarz and colleagues 
(1991) studies. Turks, Americans, and Germans all rated themselves and their parents as more 
successful on the bipolar scale than on the unipolar scale. Ratings of strangers of the same age as 
parents followed the expected pattern. Having been freed from modest self-presentational 
concerns, Chinese respondents showed the scale effect and rated strangers more positively when 
the scale was bipolar while Turkish respondents did not rate strangers more positively when 
using the bipolar scale as they did when they evaluated their parents. As expected, American 
respondents did not differentiate between ingroup and outgroup members and showed the scale 
effect in evaluating all three question targets.  
In sum, for individualistic (American, German) and culture of honor (Turkish) groups, 
the implication of the negative numbers (presence of varying degrees of failure) was enough to 
shift responses about oneself or about parent’s success up to the positive numbers (presence of 
varying degrees of success). Chinese participants also understood the scale in the same way, as 
can be seen by the fact that when there was no cultural modesty imperative (when providing a 
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proxy report on out-group members), Chinese also gave more positive responses when using the 




Whereas cognitive survey research to date has either ignored culture altogether or 
focused on a contrast between Western individualism and East Asian collectivism (for a review, 
see Schwarz, Oyserman, & Peytcheva, this volume), in the current chapter we have suggested 
that survey methodologists should also consider other forms of collectivism, particularly if their 
research participants are from Southern Europe and the Mediterranean, the Middle East or 
Africa. Our review of the culture literature highlights the influence of cultural norms on likely 
responses, even when the pragmatic meaning of questions does not differ.  In particular, we 
focused on culture-based differences in both presentation style and distinctions between the self 
and close others on the one hand and distal or out-group others on the other hand.  The literature 
on honor-based responses suggests that when cultures make salient an honor-based collectivism, 
respondents will focus on positive presentations of themselves and close others.   
Our own research in this area, however preliminary, provides support for this prediction 
and suggests that honor-based and Confucian, modesty-based collectivism likely draw attention 
to different norms relevant to survey responding. While participants all try to put their best foot 
forward, this entails modest self- and close-other deprecation for Confucian groups, but not for 
honor-based groups. Moreover, these same underlying processes will produce differing results 
for proxy reports about distal, non-group relevant others. For Confucian groups, the modesty 
norm becomes irrelevant but for honor groups, positive statements about any others are unlikely 
to be viewed as irrelevant to honor, resulting in more negative proxy reports about distal others.  
 19 
 Culture of honor research has documented that honor-based responses are relevant to a 
broad array of societies, including Southern Europe, the Mediterranean, Latin America, the 
Middle East, and Africa, and the American West and South. While current knowledge cannot 
address whether pragmatic understanding of questions differs, it is clear that the editing process 
is likely to differ across honor, modesty, and positivity cultures. Future research, targeting 
greater understanding of honor-based norms is highly relevant to the field of survey methods.  
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